Chevron, Take Two: Deference to Revised
Agency Interpretations of Statutes
David M. Gossettt
In the modern regulatory state, federal administrative agencies wield immense power. Congress not only explicitly grants
agencies authority, it also passes ambiguous statutes; the opportunity to interpret these ambiguous statutes provides an additional source of power. The Supreme Court, under the well
known Chevron doctrine,' implicitly extended this power by
holding that courts must defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. According to the Chevron Court,
agencies should interpret ambiguous statutes because they bring
more expertise to bear on such questions, because they are politically accountable, and because Congress, by leaving a statute
ambiguous, has delegated interstitial policy-making to the agencies.
What happens if an agency decides to revise its interpretation of an ambiguous statute? Before Chevron, courts traditionally gave revised interpretations less deference than they gave to
agencies' initial interpretations of statutes.2 It is unclear, however, whether this tradition can or should survive Chevron, especially since Chevron itself involved a revised agency interpretation of a statute.3 Furthermore, the reasons the Chevron Court
offered to justify deferring to agency interpretations of statutes
also justify deference to revised agency interpretations.
In the decade since Chevron, courts have struggled over
whether to give "Chevron deference" to revised interpretations:
t BA 1991, Reed College; MA 1993, The University of Pennsylvania; J.D. Candidate 1997, The University of Chicago.
Chevron USA Inc v NRDC, 467 US 837 (1984). See text accompanying notes 31-37
for a description of the Chevron doctrine.
2 See, for example, United TransportationUnion v Lewis, 711 F2d 233, 242 (DC Cir
1983) ("A statutory construction to which an agency has not consistently adhered is owed
no deference."); Frank Diehl Farms v Secretary of Labor, 696 F2d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir
1983) ("We are more reluctant to defer to an agency's more recent interpretation as
authoritative when it conflicts with earlier pronouncements of the agency."); Watt v
Alaska, 451 US 259, 273 (1981) ("The Department [of the Interior]s current interpretation, being in conflict with its initial position, is entitled to considerably less deference.").
' Chevron, 467 US at 853-59 (EPA changed its interpretation of the statutory term
"source.").
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the Supreme Court has proffered several seemingly inconsistent
views,4 while lower courts seem to focus on one or another of
these views without grasping the problem in its entirety.' At first
glance, the case law seems utterly unpredictable, a real morass.
This Comment attempts to explain what courts do when confronted with revised agency interpretations of statutes. Further
investigation of the case law reveals that courts, despite claiming
otherwise, seem to be equally deferential to revised agency interpretations of statutes as to initial interpretations. This Comment
first shows that courts treat revised interpretations the same
way they treat original interpretations, and then explains why
this practice makes sense in terms of the policies behind Chevron. Part I traces the Supreme Court's (somewhat inconsistent)
statements on deference to revised agency interpretations. Part
II briefly reviews Chevron, and the developing understanding of
deference, as background to explaining what courts are actually
doing when confronted with revised agency interpretations. Part
III then shows that revised interpretations receive as much deference as other agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.
Finally, Part IV attempts to justify this result by arguing that
the theoretical reasons for deferring to an initial agency interpretation of a statute equally mandate deferring to a revised interpretation.'
I. REVISED AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS OF STATUTES: A MORASS?
This Part will present the "doctrine" of deference, and the
Court's reasons for deferring to revised agency interpretations of
statutes. The Court's approach to deferring to revised interpretations has been quite inconsistent. In Chevron itself, the Court
acknowledged that the agency had revised its interpretation, but
did not view this as a problem:
The fact that the agency has from time to time changed its
interpretation of the term "source" does not ... lead us to
conclude that no deference should be accorded the agency's
interpretation of the statute. An initial agency interpretaSee Part I.
See notes 72-76.
This Comment does not argue that courts should defer to agency interpretations of
statutes. Instead, it makes a narrow claim-if courts are going to defer to initial agency
interpretations of statutes, they should also defer to revised interpretations. The rationales for Chevron deference apply with equal force to revised interpretations of statutes.
Thus, the aversion courts show to acknowledging their deference to these revised interpretations is misplaced.
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tion is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the
agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider
varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a
continuing basis.'
This language from Chevron suggests that agencies not only have
the power to revise their interpretations of statutes, but "must
consider"' revising their interpretations regularly to be
"informed"9 in future rulemaking.
In INS v Cardoza-Fonseca,the Court "employ[ed] traditional
tools of statutory construction" to hold that the statute at issue
was not ambiguous and that deference to the agency's interpretation was therefore not appropriate. ° In a footnote, though, the
Court discussed the fact that the agency had changed its interpretation of the statute. The Court's approach differed radically
from that taken in Chevron:
An additional reason for rejecting the INS's request for
heightened deference to its position is the inconsistency of
the positions the [Board of Immigration Appeals] has taken
through the years. An agency interpretation of a relevant
provision which conflicts with the agency's earlier interpretation is "entitled to considerably less deference" than a consistently held agency view."
Several years later, the Court revisited the issue. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had changed its
interpretation of a provision of Title X of the Public Health Services Act to bar funding for family planning clinics that mention
abortion, rather than only those that actually perform abortions.' In Rust v Sullivan, the Court upheld this new "gag rule":
This Court has rejected the argument that an agency's interpretation "is not entitled to deference because it repreChevron, 467 US at 863-64.
Id at 863 (emphasis added).
'
10

Id.
480 US 421, 446 (1987). Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, agreed that the

statute was unambiguous, but disputed the use of such "tools" as a means of interpreting
statutes, claiming that such use "would make deference a doctrine of desperation,
authorizing courts to defer only if they would otherwise be unable to construe the enactment at issue. This is not an interpretation but an evisceration of Chevron." Id at 454

(Scalia concurring).
"Id at 446 n 30 (majority opinion), quoting Watt v Alaska, 451 US 259, 273 (1981).
"[N]one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs
where abortion is a method of family planning." Rust v Sullivan, 500 US 173, 184 (1991)

(citation omitted).
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sents a sharp break with prior interpretations" of the statute in question. In Chevron, we held that a revised interpretation deserves deference because "[a]n initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone" and "the agency,
to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing
basis." An agency is not required to "'establish rules of conduct to last forever," but rather "must be given ample latitude to 'adapt [its] rules and policies to the demands of
changing circumstances.""'
The Court proceeded to hold that "the Secretary amply justified
his change of interpretation with a 'reasoned analysis." 4
While this seems straightforward, the Court, later the same
term in Pauley v BethEnergy Mines, Inc, stated in dicta that "[a]s
a general matter, of course, the case for judicial deference is less
compelling with respect to agency positions that are inconsistent
with previously held views. " "
The next time the Court directly confronted the issue, in
6 it came up with yet anGood Samaritan Hospital v Shalala,"
other standard-or at least further muddied the waters. This
case involved HHS's interpretation of a reimbursement provision
under the Medicare program. The Court first declared that:
The Secretary is not estopped from changing a view she believes to have been grounded upon a mistaken legal interpretation. Indeed, an administrative agency is not disqualified from changing its mind; and when it does, the courts
still sit in review of the administrative decision and should
not approach the statutory construction issue de novo and
without regard to the administrative understanding of the
statutes.'
However, the Court then proceeded to quote the language in
Cardoza-Fonsecacited above," thereby undermining this newer
standard. To confuse the reader further, the Court also stated
' Id at 186-87 (citations omitted), quoting Chevron, 467 US at 862, 863-64, and Motor
Vehicle Mfrs Assn v State Farm MutualAuto Ins Co, 463 US 29, 42 (1983) ("State Farm").
" Rust, 500 US at 187, quoting State Farm, 463 US at 42. See text accompanying
notes 94-96 (discussing how requiring an explanation for a change is different from refusing to defer equally to revised interpretations).
501 US 680, 698 (1991) (citation omitted). The Court found no inconsistency in the
agency's interpretation in this case. Id.
" 508 US 402 (1993).
17 Id at 417 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
" See text accompanying note 11.
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that "[h]ow much weight should be given to the agency's views in
such a situation... will depend on the facts of individual cases,
in particular where [the agency's] shifts might[, as was possible
in this case,] have resulted from intervening and possibly erroneous judicial decisions and its current position from one of our
own rulings." 9 The court also concluded that:
In the circumstances of this case, where the agency's interpretation of a statute is at least as plausible as competing
ones, there is little, if any, reason not to defer to its construction. We should be especially reluctant to reject the
agency's current view which, as we see it, so closely fits the
design of the statute as a whole and its object and policy.2"
The Court did not face a revised agency interpretation in the
1995 term, but set forth in dictum yet another standard for deferring to them. In Smiley v Citibank (South Dakota), N.A, 2 the
Court held that the Comptroller of the Currency had not changed
his interpretation of a statute. It further stated, however, that:
Of course the mere fact that an agency interpretation contradicts a prior agency position is not fatal. Sudden and unexplained change, or change that does not take account of
legitimate reliance on prior interpretation, may be
"arbitrary, capricious [or] an abuse of discretion." But if
these pitfalls are avoided, change is not invalidating, since
the whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing
22
agency.
The Court's precedents since Chevron, then, do not paint a
straightforward picture of how much deference a revised interpretation of a statute is due. The Court in Chevron, Rust, and
Smiley seems to indicate that these interpretations are due as
much deference as any other interpretation. In Good Samaritan
Good Samaritan,508 US at 417.
Id (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). It is unclear how upholding an
agency's interpretation, given the facts described in this quotation, would count as
"deference." See also Thomas Jefferson University v Shalala, 114 S Ct 2381 (1994), which
arguably involved an HHS reinterpretation of a regulation. The Court held that the interpretation had not changed, but, citing Good Samaritan, held that the interpretation
still deserved deference even if it had.
2.

116 S Ct 1730 (1996).

' Id at 1734 (citations omitted, brackets in original). See text accompanying notes 9496 for a discussion of requiring an explanation for change; see also text accompanying
notes 106-07, disputing the applicability of "reliance" interests to agency statutory interpretation.
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the Court seems to mandate somewhat less deference, however,
and in Cardoza-Fonsecaand Pauley the Court clearly states that
revised interpretations should receive less deference. Thus, either the Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its view of how
much deference revised agency interpretations deserve, or these
various statements do not adequately describe what is really going on. Part III of this Comment will look at what courts actually
do when confronted with revised agency interpretations of statutes. But first, Part II will provide some background on Chevron
deference and its justifications.
H. CHEVRON AND THEORIES OF DEFERENCE
Chevron is one of the most important Supreme Court decisions dealing with the administrative state.' In a single blow,
the Court granted agencies the power to resolve questions of law,
arguably undermining the classic view of the role of the courts as
expressed in Marbury v Madison.' Although Chevron remains
controversial,25 it is settled law and this Comment does not question it. Before further investigating how Chevron applies to revised interpretations, this Part explains how Chevron applies to
consistently held interpretations. This Part will first describe the
"Chevron two-step,"26 then present the classic justifications for
Chevron deference, and finally discuss various types of agency interpretations that are not considered to warrant deference.

"Many have made this claim; see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Law and AdministrationAfter Chevron, 90 Colum L Rev 2071, 2074-75 (1990) ("In view of the breadth

and importance of the decision... Chevron promises to be a pillar in admini trative law
for many years to come."); Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretations ofLaw, 1989 Duke L J 511, 512 ("Chevron has proven a highly important decision
5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."). See also Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2075
(cited in note 23) ("[Chevron] has become a kind of Marbury, or counter-Marbury, for the
administrative state.").
See, for example, Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 BC L Rev 757, 761-62 (1991) (Chevron unconstitutional and bad policy); Kevin W. Saunders, Agency Interpretationsand JudicialReview: A Search for Limitations on the ControllingEffect GivenAgency Statutory Constructions, 30 Ariz L Rev 769, 786, 800 (1988) (expressing dismay over the decline of judicial
review); Keith Werhan, The NeoclassicalRevival in Administrative Law, 44 Admin L Rev
567, 568-69 (1992) (Chevron inconsistent with history and with the traditional purposive
approach to statutory interpretation).
"Kenneth W. Starr, et al, JudicialReview of Administrative Action in a Conservative
Era, 39 Admin L Rev 353, 360 (1987) (panel discussion) (Starr speaking).
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A. The Chevron Two-Step
In 1981, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
changed its interpretation of the term "stationary source" as used
in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.27 Under the Clean Air
Act, the EPA could require states to institute programs obligating pollution-emitting facilities to get approval whenever a modification to a "stationary source" would increase that source's total
emissions." The EPA revised its definition so that an entire
plant, rather than each individual piece of pollution-emitting
equipment, counted as a "stationary source."29 The D.C. Circuit
set aside the revised regulation," but, in Chevron USA Inc v
NRDC,31 the Supreme Court reversed. In so doing, the Court
outlined the following methodology for reviewing agency interpretations of statutes:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions.
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 2
The Court continued in a footnote: "The court need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the
2' The term appears at 42 USC § 7411(aX3) (1994).

Chevron, 467 US at 839-40; 42 USC § 7502(bX6) (1977) (repealed 1990).
Chevron, 467 US at 853-56. The revised regulation was part of President Reagan's
attempt at deregulation, "a 'Government-wide reexamination of regulatory burdens and
complexities.'" Id at 857 (citation omitted). The new regulation prescribed a "bubble" concept of source, whereby an entire plant, rather than each individual piece of machinery,
could be considered a source. Under this regime, a plant could alter machinery however it
wanted, so long as total emissions released by the plant did not rise. Thus, a plant could
choose the most cost-effective method for keeping its pollution under a prescribed level.
NRDC v Gorsuch, 685 F2d 718, 728 (DC Cir 1982).
"467 US 837 (1984).

Id at 842-43 (footnotes omitted).
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reading the court would have reached if the question initially had
arisen in a judicial proceeding."3 Thus, if a statute is ambiguous
and an agency's interpretation of the statute is reasonable, a
court must defer to the agency even if, in the court's view, the
agency is wrong.'
Most commentators agree that Chevron represented a shift
in the law of deference." Prior to Chevron, courts deferred only to
certain agency interpretations. For example, courts would not defer to agency interpretations of "pure questions of law."" Moreover, many commentators claim that pre-Chevron courts deferred
intermittently, a practice Chevron seems to have ended.
Whether or not Chevron actually represented such a shift, it did
set forth a clear methodology for deference decisions and explain
the policies the Supreme Court viewed as relevant to such decisions.
B. Reasons for Chevron Deference
Courts and scholars typically explain the Chevron analysis
with at least one of three justifications for Chevron deference:
agency expertise, political accountability, and congressional intent.3 The Court in Chevron identified two of these. First, the
Id at 843 n 11.
This is precisely what the Court ordered in Chevron:
[T]he Court of Appeals misconceived the nature of its role.... Once it determined,
after its own examination of the legislation, that Congress did not actually have an
intent regarding the applicability of the bubble concept to the permit program, the
question before it was not whether in its view the concept is "inappropriate" in the
general context of a program designed to improve air quality, but whether the Administrator's view that it is appropriate in the context of this particular program is a
reasonable one.
Id at 845.
See, for example, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review ofAgency Interpretationsof Statutory Provisions,41 Vand L Rev 301, 302 (1988) ("In
the three years since the Court decided Chevron, the case has transformed dramatically
the approach taken by courts in reviewing agency interpretations of statutory provisions."); Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 512-13 (cited in note 23) (Chevron was not completely
new law, but a choice between conflicting lines of Supreme Court precedent.). But see
Russell L. Weaver, Some Realism about Chevron, 58 Mo L Rev 129, 130-32 (1993)
(Chevron changed the terms of the debate, but was not a radical doctrinal shift.).
"See, for example, NLRB v Hearst Publications,322 US 111, 130 (1944). See also
Sunstin, 90 Colum L Rev at 2094-96 (cited in note 23).
Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2081-82 & nn 47-48 (cited in note 23) (collecting
cases); Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 512-13 (cited in note 23).
"Few list the justifications in exactly this form, but most identify either subsets of
these or subdivide them further. See, for example, Kenneth W. Starr, JudicialReview in
the Post-Chevron Era, 3 Yale J Reg, 283, 309-12 (1986) (identifying four: expertise, accountability, requiring Congress to be more precise in drafting statutes, and requiring
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agency will have expertise in the area of law under consideration
that the court will probably lack. 9 Second, the agency is politically accountable, whereas the court is not. As the Court put it:
[An agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation,
properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of
wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is,
and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices.... .'
A third reason for deferring to agency interpretations is implicit
in Chevron, and underlies the first two reasons: By leaving a
statute ambiguous, Congress is indicating that it wants the
courts to defer to agency interpretations.4 1 If facts change, or the
parties to take administrative agency proceedings more seriously); Scalia, 1989 Duke L J
at 516-17 (cited in note 23) (focusing on one: real or presumed congressional intent);
Quincy M. Crawford, Comment, Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretationsthat Delimit
the Scope of the Agency's Jurisdiction,61 U Chi L Rev 957, 958-60 (1994) (identifying
three justifications-that Chevron created a default rule against which Congress can legislate, legislative intent, and political accountability-that together parallel two of the rationales identified in the text).
Chevron, 467 US at 865.
Id. See also Laurence H. Silberman, The D.C. Circuit Review-Foreword: Chevron-The Intersectionof Law & Policy, 58 Geo Wash L Rev 821, 822 (1990) ("Chevron's
rule... is simply sound recognition that a political branch, the executive, has a greater
claim to make policy choices than the judiciary."). This rationale for deference is often
called the "Separation of Powers" rationale. See, for example, Maureen B. Callahan, Must
Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretationsof Statutes?: A New Doctrinal Basis for
Chevron U.SA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991 Wis L Rev 1275, 1286. Note
that this would imply that independent agencies might not deserve Chevron deference,
though no commentary seems to have explored this idea.
" For versions of the argument that deference depends on congressional will, see, for
example, Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin L
Rev 363, 372 (1986) (Courts should defer based on "Congress' intent that courts give an
agency's legal interpretations special weight."); Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 516-17 (cited in
note 23) (best justification for Chevron is presumed legislative intent to confer discretion
on the agency); Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2090 (cited in note 23) (same). See also
Smiley v Citibank(South Dakota), N., 116 S Ct 1730, 1733.(1996):
We accord deference to agencies under Chevron, not because of a presumption that
they drafted the provisions in question, or were present at the hearings, or spoke to
the principal sponsors; but rather because of a presumption that Congress, when it
left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that
the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the
agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.
A similar argument can be made regarding the institutional role of courts; Justice
Scalia's judicial minimalism, that is, his view that courts should interpret things so as to
make as few subjective choices as possible, see Michael J. Perry, The Constitutionand the
Courts: Law or Politics?84-85 (Oxford 1994), leads to the conclusion that agencies rather
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administration's priorities change, the agency can do something
new simply by reinterpreting existing ambiguities. For example,
by using the ambiguous term "stationary source" in the Clean Air
Act, Congress implicitly told the Court that it was perfectly appropriate for different administrations to interpret this term in
different fashions; the Reagan Administration could therefore
use this ambiguity to lessen regulatory burdens on industry.42
C. Exceptions to Chevron Deference
In the decade since Chevron, courts have recognized a number of exceptions to the doctrine of deference.' These exceptions
involve situations where deference is inappropriate regardless of
the substance of the agency's interpretation, and regardless of
whether the agency's interpretation is an initial or revised one."
In almost all of the situations discussed here, refusing to defer is
either consistent with, or a necessary implication of, the justifications the Chevron Court gave for deferring. In order to understand what courts do when confronted with revised agency interpretations of statutes, one must first understand these exceptions and the rationales underlying them; they explain many of
the seemingly inconsistent results from courts faced with revised
interpretations of statutes.'
1. Unambiguity.
Strictly speaking, cases in which statutes are unambiguous
are not exceptions to Chevron deference because they come under
the first step of Chevron, the question of whether Congress has
"directly spoken to the precise question at issue[, thus requiring]
the court ...

[to] give effect to the unambiguously expressed in-

tent of Congress."46 In these cases the courts never reach the
question of deference, and thus these cases are analytically parthan courts should interpret ambiguity.
See Chevron, 467 US at 840.
See, for example, Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2093-2104 (cited in note 23)
(discussing various exceptions implicit in the Chevron framework for deference); Theodore L. Garrett, JudicialReview After Chevron: The Courts Reassert Their Role, 10 Nat
Resources & Envir 59, 61-63 (1995) (also discussing exceptions to Chevron). The list of exceptions in the text is not identical to that in any other source; it is consistent with, but
more complete than, these others.
In the end, the court might interpret the statute in the same way that the agency
had. In these situations, though, the court decides on an interpretation while completely
ignoring the agency's interpretation.
,See Part I.
Chevron, 467 US at 842-43.

1997]

Chevron Deference

allel to other exceptions to Chevron deference: the court will refuse to defer without looking at the interpretation proffered by
the agency.
The crucial insight here is that the logic of Chevron supports
not deferring to agency interpretations in these cases; the reasons given for deference in Chevron don't apply. Interpreting unambiguous statutes is a skill that neither expertise nor political
accountability will improve.' In fact, the statute's clarity can be
taken as a sign that Congress did not want to delegate interpretation to the agency-it spelled the answer out itself.'
2. Litigation positions.
Arguments that an agency makes in the course of litigation
are a classic example of a type of "interpretation" that does not
receive deference under Chevron. These "convenient litigating
positions" never receive deference, regardless of whether the interpretation adopted during litigation is a change from prior interpretations or concerns a question that the agency has never
previously considered.49 The problem with these interpretations,
whether or not they are revisionary, is that they are inherently
suspect; needless to say, an agency is going to try to win litigation in which it has become involved. 0
See text accompanying notes 39-40.
,There is a current debate among scholars and Justices over how extensively to use
"traditional tools of statutory construction to determine if a statute is ambiguous. Compare Cardoza-Fonseca,480 US at 446-48 (endorsing use of such tools), with id at 454-55
(Scalia concurring) (disputing the use of such tools). See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The
Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in
the Administrative State, 95 Colum L Rev 749 (1995) (arguing for more deference and less
usage of such tools). One's view of this debate does not differentially affect revised interpretation of statutes, however, except insofar as those who are more in favor of deference
in one situation may be more in favor of deference generally.
"Bowen v Georgetown University Hospital, 488 US 204, 212-13 (1988) ("Deference to
what appears to be nothing more than an agency's convenient litigating position would be
entirely inappropriate."); FloridaManufactured HousingAssn v Cisneros, 53 F3d 1565,
1574 (11th Cir 1995) (no deference to changed interpretation when the new interpretation
is a mere litigation position); USX Corp v Office of Workers' CompensationPrograms,978
F2d 656, 658 (11th Cir 1992) (no deference to agency's litigating position absent prior interpretation). See also Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency InterpretationsShould Bind
Citizens and the Courts?, 7 Yale J Reg 1, 60-61 (1990) (Litigation positions do not and
should not get deference.).
Judge Learned Hand once said that "a public officer, charged with the enforcement
of a law, is different from one who must decide a dispute. If there is a fair doubt, his duty
is to present the case for the side which he represents.... Since such [positions] ... may
properly carry a bias, it would seem that they should not be as authoritative. . . ." Fishgold v Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp, 154 F2d 785, 789 (2d Cir 1946), affd, 328 US 275
(1946).
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If courts deferred to litigation positions, agencies would almost never lose cases. All that an agency would have to do to win
a case would be to "interpret" the statute in its brief, regardless
of the agency's actual interpretation of that statute or the position it had argued to the court in a previous case. Furthermore,
the reasons for deferring to agency interpretations underlying
Chevron are inapposite here. Congress has no authority to delegate the power to decide specific cases; that is the constitutional
purview of the courts.5
3. Stare decisis.
Courts also refuse to defer to new agency interpretations
when the Supreme Court has previously interpreted the statute.
If the Court has already defined the meaning of an arguably ambiguous statutory term, that interpretation remains the law until
and unless Congress changes the statute.52
While this exception may not be completely sensible," it does
not imply that revised agency interpretations do not deserve defAnother worry about litigation positions is that they are not general statements of
agency policy, and there is no guarantee that the agency will use the same interpretation
in other cases. General positions are less worrisome, since there is a reduced fear of bias.
See, for example, Lawrence v Chater, 116 S Ct 604 (1996), in which the Court granted
"GVR" (grant of certiorari, vacatur, and remand) for the appellate court to consider a new,
generally applicable regulation reinterpreting the statute in question, where the new
regulation was issued while certiorari was pending. Given that the new interpretation
was generally applicable, the Court was less concerned that it was issued for improper
motives.
" Furthermore, the most direct route to agency accountability for interpretations is
through the notice and comment period usually required prior to the adoption of a rule.
5 USC § 553 (1994). By contrast, no one reads all the briefs an agency files in all cases it
is involved with.
52 Neal v United States, 116 S Ct 763, 766, 768-69 (1996) (holding that court must follow prior Supreme Court decision defining LSD mixture to include carrier medium, despite new Sentencing Commission guideline stating that it does not). At least one circuit
court has held that the same rule of stare decisis applies to circuit court interpretations of
statutes as well. EEOC v MetropolitanEducationalEnterprises,Inc, 60 F3d 1225, 122930 (7th Cir 1995) (refusing to defer when prior Seventh Circuit precedent existed), revd
on other grounds, 117 S Ct 660 (1997).
"There are three scenarios where the question of deferring despite precedent can
arise: where a court interpreted a statute before Chevron was decided; where a court interpreted a statute after Chevron and deferred to the agency; and where a court interpreted a statute after Chevron and, for one reason or another, refused to defer to the
agency's interpretation. It is clear that, in this last case, the agency should not be able to
alter its interpretation contrary to the court's controlling precedent. It remains unclear
why an agency should not be able to change its interpretation when the "precedent" being
enforced against its new interpretation is simply a prior court having deferred to the
agency's then-current interpretation, see Rebecca Hanner White, The Stare Decisis
'Exception" to the Chevron Deference Rule, 44 Fla L Rev 723, 726-28 (1992), nor why
precedent from before the Chevron deference rule was promulgated should control, see

1997]

Chevron Deference

erence. The main reason for the stare decisis exception is the institutional relationship between Congress and the courts. As the
Court put it, "[o]ur reluctance to overturn precedents derives in
part from institutional concerns about the relationship of the judiciary to Congress .... 'Congress is free to change this Court's
interpretation of its legislation.'"' This rationale applies independently of the justifications for Chevron, and does not affect
revised agency interpretations in the absence of Court precedent.
4. Constitutionality.
Courts do not defer to agency interpretations that tread close
to constitutional issues. Though many have criticized the doctrine that statutes should be interpreted to avoid constitutional
questions, 5 the doctrine does apply to agency interpretations.56
Again, this exception to the Chevron doctrine is consistent with
the reasons for Chevron deference, because resolving these cases
requires interpreting the Constitution, not just the statute at
hand. Courts undoubtedly have more expertise to do this than
agencies. Furthermore, courts are more visible than agencies
with regard to constitutional issues, and we expect courts to decide these issues.57
5. Jurisdictional questions.
Finally, courts seem to refuse to defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute when that statute defines the limits of the
agency's jurisdiction.58 This exception is also sensible in light of
Jahan Sharifi, Comment, Precedents ConstruingStatutes Administered by FederalAgencies After the Chevron Decision: What Gives?, 60 U Chi L Rev 223, 229, 244-47 (1993)
(Precedent from before Chevron should be viewed as merely "informative-not as binding
precedent.").
Neal, 116 S Ct at 769, quoting Illinois Brick Co v Illinois, 431 US 720, 736 (1977).
See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts:Crisis and Reform 284-86
(Harvard 1985) (Doctrine allows courts to interpret constitutional statutes in ways contrary to congressional intent.).
' DeBartolo Corp v Florida Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 US 568, 575 (1988)
("[Where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems... ."). See
also Eric M. Braun, Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretationof Chevron
U.S. Inc. v. NRDC, 87 Colum L Rev 986, 1002-03 (1987) ("[Algency interpretations that
raise constitutional issues are less likely to merit deference."); Kent v Dulles, 357 US 116,
130 (1958) (Absent explicit terms, the Court will assume that Congress did not intend to
raise constitutional questions.).
" See Braun, Note, 87 Colum L Rev at 1003 (cited in note 56) ("Congress is likely to
entrust constitutionally charged statutory issues to the judiciary. Agencies have little expertise in constitutional interpretation....").
' Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretationand Lawmaking
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the underlying principles of Chevron-limitations on an agency's
jurisdiction are, in a sense, a direct refutation of the agency's expertise. This is an exception that, like the refusal to defer to litigation positions, makes sense as an effort to prevent agencies
from exercising limitless discretion.
III.

CLEARING THE WATER: DEFERENCE TO REVISED AGENCY
INTERPRETATIONS OF STATUTES IN PRACTICE

The previous Part has provided a fairly uncontroversial exposition of Chevron, its rationales, and its exceptions. The question at hand, though, is how courts deal with revised agency interpretations of statutes. This Part attempts to answer that
question by examining Supreme Court and federal appellate
court practice since Chevron.
A. Supreme Court Cases
Since Chevron, the Court has decided few cases involving revised agency interpretations of statutes-and in those few cases
it set forth inconsistent standards. 9 Yet, in most of these cases,
the Court deferred to the agency's interpretation, no matter what
standard for deference it set forth. Moreover, in those cases
where the Court did not defer to a revised interpretation, there
were independent reasons not to defer, apart from the revision in
the agency's interpretation. The exceptions to Chevron deference
discussed in Part II explain all cases where the Court failed to
defer to an agency's revised statutory interpretation. In other
words, in no case since Chevron has the revision of an interpretation been dispositive of whether the Court deferred to that interpretation.
Of the cases discussed in Part I where the agency's interpretation changed, the Court deferred in all but Cardoza-Fonseca.°
6 and Rust,62 the Court deferred to revised
In Good Samaritan
agency interpretations, as it did, of course, in Chevron." In Car-

Under Chevron, 6 Admin L J 187,216-21 (1992). But see Crawford, Comment, 61 U Chi L
Rev at 958 (cited in note 38) (disputing that this exception exists and arguing that it
should not).
See Part I.
" 480 US 421.
61 508 US 402.

500 US 173.
467 US 837. Likewise, in Thomas Jefferson University v Shalala, 114 S Ct 2381,
2389 (1994), discussed in note 20, the Court, while claiming the agency had not changed
its interpretation, argued that the interpretation would have deserved deference anyway.
62
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doza-Fonseca, however, the Court mentioned the change in the
agency's interpretation only in a footnote. The Court's main
holding was that the statute involved was not ambiguous-and
no one has argued that courts should defer to agency interpretations of unambiguous statutes."
In no case has the Court refused to defer to a revised interpretation of a statute when that interpretation did not also come
within a clear exception to the principle of Chevron deference."
While telling, this assertion must be limited in two ways. First, it
ignores the Court's rhetoric. Given the inconsistencies in what
the Court has said, however," it seems likely that something else
underlies these decisions. Second, the Court has faced relatively
few cases involving revised agency interpretations of statutes; it
is thus possible that this result is simply a fluke. One way to investigate this second problem is to see what lower courts have
done when faced with revised interpretations.
B. Appellate Court Cases
This section examines how lower courts have dealt with revised agency interpretations of statutes in the years since Chevron. Given that Chevron has been cited in over 3,500 federal decisions,67 an exhaustive inquiry into all such cases would be impossible. Unbiased samples of these cases, however, are readily
See Part II.C.I.
There have been a few other cases involving revised interpretations in addition to
Cardoza-Fonsea-allinvolving stare decisis-in which the Court did not defer. See, for
example, Neal v United States, 116 S Ct 763, 769 (1996) (discussed in note 52); Lechmere,
Inc v NLRB, 502 US 527, 536-37 (1992) ("Once we have determined a statute's clear
meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we
judge an agency's later interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of
the statute's meaning.") (citations omitted). But again, this is not at all inconsistent with
the principle that agencies are allowed to change their interpretations of statutes.
The Court has also discussed deference to revised interpretations in several cases
where it held that the agency had not changed its interpretation, see, for example, Pauley
v BethEnergy Mines, Inc, 501 US 680, 698 (1991); Smiley v Citibank (South Dakota), NA,
116 S Ct 1730, 1733 (1996), but these, as dicta, do not inform an analysis of the Court's
behaviorwhere there is a revised interpretation.
Compare Russell L. Weaver, A Foolish Consistency Is the Hobgoblin of Little Minds,
44 Baylor L Rev 529, 545-50 (1992). Weaver identifies three cases where the Court refused to defer to new interpretations, and argues that the Court is "avoiding" Chevron in
these cases. These three cases, however, were Cardoza-Fonsecaand two cases involving
stare decisis. That these cases are ones in which the Court did not defer for independent
reasons seems more likely than that the court was simply "avoiding" its precedent.
See Part I.
A LEXIS search conducted on December 5, 1996, in the GENFEDS:COURTS database, generated 3,567 cases citing Chevron. The results of the LEXIS search are on file
with U Chi L Rev.
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available,68 and an exhaustive look at all 1995 appellate cases
and selected earlier cases supports the claim that courts are deferring fully to revised interpretations. 69 Between the investigations of all 1995 cases and selected earlier cases, a total of fortythree cases involved revised agency interpretations of statutes."

' Unbiased in the technical sense that the samples discussed have no systematic bias
towards any result.
Chevron was cited in 206 federal appellate cases in 1995, all of which were examined. Twenty-four of these cases involved revised interpretations of statutes. Summaries
of all cases involving revised agency interpretations of statutes are on file with U Chi L
Rev.
In several other cases in 1995 the courts discussed the amount of deference due to revised interpretations, but determined that the agency's interpretations had been consistently held. See, for example, Zhang v Slattery, 55 F3d 732, 750 (2d Cir 1995) (noting that
revised interpretations may be due less deference, but that here the agency did not
change its interpretation), cert denied, 116 S Ct 1271 (1996). These cases are not further
analyzed, since the courts' actions in them do not indicate how they would respond to revised interpretations.
It would be almost impossible to look at all relevant cases before 1995, i.e., all cases
that discuss Chevron. The group of pre-1995 cases investigated here is a set that would be
the most likely not to support the claim in the text, however, and at the same time include the most relevant cases. These cases, nineteen in all, were gathered from headnotes. All cases since 1987 which were filed under the headnotes "Statutes: Executive
Construction: In General" or "Statutes: Executive Construction: Long Continuance of
Construction," and where the headnote discussed the effect of a change in agency interpretation on deference, were examined; in nineteen cases the agency's interpretation had
actually changed. This group of cases should be especially relevant, in that the cases all
involved some discussion of the amount of deference accorded to revised interpretations.
It seems logical that cases in which there was little or no discussion of the deference accorded to revised interpretations would receive more such deference, given the overall
bias towards deference mandated by Chevron.
The main problem with this analysis is that there is no way, given the immense variability among cases involving agency interpretations of statutes, to make any sort of empirical claim that courts would have behaved differently if an interpretation had not
changed. A seemingly parallel set of cases involving consistently held interpretations
might involve statutes that differ radically from those underlying these cases, and there
is no method with which to measure, let alone control, this variability.
Other problems include the focus on appellate cases. Although appellate courts review district court decisions of law de novo, by focusing exclusively on appellate decisions
this analysis would not show if lower courts were actually deciding cases differently.
Likewise, any case that did not cite Chevron would not have been examined. See Thomas
W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L J 969, 980-82 (1992)
(arguing that the Court does not always cite Chevron when it could). It is also quite likely
that some cases which were excluded from further analysis due to a lack of any evidence
of a revised interpretation actually involved one. At the same time, the lack of discussion
of such revisions presumably indicates either that the judge did not know that the interpretation had changed or that she found this fact irrelevant. In both cases the revision
presumably would not affect the outcome.
70 See summaries on file with U Chi L Rev.
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1. Cases in which the court deferred.
In the majority of cases examined, the courts-whatever
their rhetoric-deferred to the interpretation offered by an
agency.7 ' In some of these cases, the courts tried to avoid the issue by arguing that the agency's interpretation might not actually be inconsistent with prior interpretations.72 In many others,
the courts claimed to be according the agency less deference, but
still deferred.73 In still other cases, courts held that the agency
was required to provide an explanation for why it had changed
its view, 4 at which point the new interpretation deserved deference.75 These courts seemed to consider the requirement of an
explanation to be a rather low hurdle.7" But, regardless of the
rhetoric, the fact remains that in over half the cases in the survey, the courts deferred to the agency's changed interpretation of
"The court deferred in twenty-three of the forty-three cases.
See, for example, Queen of Angels v Shalala, 65 F3d 1472, 1480-81 (9th Cir 1995)
("[E]ven if these scattered statements suggest that the Secretary has been somewhat inconsistent in her view of the PRO Payment Rule, ...

[and] even if we... assume the

statute is ambiguous, the Secretary's inconsistency is probably insufficient alone to invalidate her interpretation."); National ClassificationCommittee v United States, 22 F3d
1174, 1177 (DC Cir 1994) ("[The ICC's current position appears to be consistent with its
past decisions.... Even if the ICC's interpretation of [the] section [ ] has changed since
1988, no rule of law prevents such a change. Rather an agency may depart from its past
interpretation so long as it provides a reasoned basis for the change.") (citation omitted).
"See, for example, Norwest Corp v Commissionerof InternalRevenue, 69 F3d 1404,
1410 (8th Cir 1995) ("shift in position can be relevant to determining reasonableness,
[but] is not determinative"), cert denied, 116 S Ct 1704 (1996); Mobil Oil Corp v EPA, 871
F2d 149, 152 (DC Cir 1989) ("Although the consistency of an agency's interpretation is
one relevant factor in judging its reasonableness, an agency's reinterpretation of statutory language is nevertheless entitled to deference, so long as the agency acknowledges
and explains the departure from its prior views.") (citation omitted).
"See Rust, 500 US at 187. See also text accompanying notes 94-96.
See, for example, Torrington Extend-A-Care Employee Assn v NALRB, 17 F3d 580,
589 (2d Cir 1994) ("[Ain agency may alter its interpretation of a statute so long as the
new rule is consistent with the statute, applies to all litigants, and is supported by a
'reasoned analysis.' Such a new rule must be upheld by the courts 'regardless of how we
might have decided the matter in the first instance [if the Board]... has arrived at one
reasonable resolution of the problem in a reasonable matter."') (citations omitted); Strickland v Commissioner, Maine Dept of Human Services, 48 F3d 12, 18 (1st Cir) ("[A]n explained modification, even one that represents a sharp departure from a longstanding
prior interpretation, ordinarily retains whatever deference is due."), cert denied, 116 S Ct
145 (1995).
" See, for example, Sacred HeartMedical Centerv Sullivan, 958 F2d 537, 545 (3d Cir
1992) (Where the agency "contend[ed] that... its [new] construction is in full accord with
the language of the [statute] and the legislative intent that motivated its enactment," the
court held that "[t]his surely constitutes a 'reasoned justification' for the Secretary's departure from its prior interpretation."); Detroit/Wayne County Port Authority v ICC, 59
F3d 1314, 1317 (DC Cir 1995) ("Because the Commission has 'providetd] a reasoned
analysis indicating that [its] prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed,
not casually ignored,' we can defer to its new interpretation.... .") (citation omitted).
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a statute, despite the revision. Even before looking at those cases
where the courts did not defer, it seems that courts are being
rather deferential to revised agency interpretations.
2. Cases in which the court did not defer for reasons other
than the revision.
The striking thing about the next fourteen cases in the survey is that the courts consistently stated that the change in
agency interpretation was a reason for giving the agency less
deference, while at the same time ruling against the agency on
grounds that would have obligated the courts to reach the same
result even if the agency's interpretation had been consistently
held." All of these cases involved statutory interpretations that,
under Chevron, would not be deferred to even had they never
changed. For example, some cases involved arguably unconstitutional interpretations, which never deserve deference under
Chevron." Similarly, in several cases the courts observed that
revised interpretations deserve less deference, but then held that
the statute in question was not ambiguous at all."
The same pattern of declaring revised interpretations to be
due less deference, while deciding the case on other grounds, applied to those cases where the agency's interpretation of a statute

This claim must be qualified by the fact that it involves a prediction of what the
court would have done if, counter-factually, the interpretation had never changed. There
is no way to prove that the court would have refused to defer to the agency interpretation
in these cases were that interpretation not altered. In other words, courts may be using
these alternative grounds for refusing deference as a "back door" to refusing to defer to
revised interpretations. The point, however, is that under Chevron deference doctrine
they should not have deferred to these interpretations even were they not revisions, given
the courts' holdings.
" See, for example, Chamber of Commerce v FEC, 69 F3d 600, 604-05 (DC Cir 1995).
In this case, the Federal Elections Commission interpreted a term defining who counted
as members of "membership organizations" for purposes of a ban on solicitations from
non-members. The court held that the interpretation proffered arguably violated the First
Amendment, and stated that "[w]e are obliged to construe the statute to avoid constitutional difficulties if such a construction is not plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.
Accordingly, the Commission is not entitled to Chevron deference with regard to its interpretation of the statute." Id at 605 (citations omitted). See also Yeung v RS, 76 F3d 337,
339 (11th Cir 1996) (current interpretation of statute by Board of Immigration Appeals
violates Equal Protection Clause); Part II.C.4.
See, for example, Madison Galleries,Ltd v United States, 870 F2d 627, 631 (Fed Cir
1989) (citing Cardoza-Fonsecafor proposition that changing interpretations deserve less
deference, but holding that a statute was not ambiguous); St Luke's Hospital v Secretary
of Health and Human Services, 810 F2d 325, 331 (1st Cir 1987) (holding that the statute
involved was unambiguous, but also claiming that the inconsistency in interpretation
"detracts considerably from the force of the Secretary's present view").
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was inconsistent with prior court precedent,"0 or seemed to have
been adopted solely as a litigation position."' These are all cases
that the courts would have decided exactly as they did even if the
interpretations involved had been the initial interpretations proffered by the agencies.
3. Other cases.
Six cases remain out of the forty-three investigated. Two of
these cases are straightforward: the appellate court refused to
defer to a revised agency interpretation, and the Supreme Court
reversed." In two other cases the courts determined that the
agencies had not given adequate reasons for revising their interpretations of statutes. For example, in Cross-Sound Ferry Services, Inc v ICC,I the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
had altered its interpretation of the term "ferry" in a statute. The

court agreed that the term was ambiguous," and was not averse
to the agency altering its interpretation of the statute.' The
court, however, could not determine why the agency had changed
its interpretation nor exactly what the new definition was; the
court therefore held that it "[could not] defer to what [it could
s There was only one such case in the sample. In EEOC v Metropolitan Educational
Enterprises,Inc, 60 F3d 1225 (7th Cir 1995), revd on other grounds, 117 S Ct 660 (1997),
the agency's definition of employer under Title VII differed from the established Seventh
Circuit definition. The court's response was clear, and showed that its refusal to defer had
nothing to do with any change in the agency's interpretation. "While we afford deference
to legitimate agency interpretations of statutory language made before we have ruled on
an issue, the converse is not true: the judiciary, not administrative agencies, is the final
arbiter of statutory construction." Id at 1229-30 (citations omitted).
" See, for example, Florida Manufactured Housing Assn v Cisneros, 53 F3d 1565,
1574 (11th Cir 1995) (holding that HUD's claim that an appeal of a regulation was untimely was a litigating position, but also stating that "the consistency of [an agency's] interpretation is an important factor in determining the amount of deference owed"
(citations omitted)); Wolpaw v Commissionerof InternalRevenue, 47 F3d 787, 790-91 (6th
Cir 1995) (IRS litigation position not due deference; also quotes Cardoza-Fonseca,however, for proposition that changed interpretations are due less deference).
' These cases were challenges to the same agency interpretation creating the "gag
rule" that the Court confronted in Rust v Sullivan, 500 US 173 (1991). In these two cases,
the appellate courts had refused to defer to the agency's interpretation; the Court vacated
both decisions, citing Rust. Massachusettsv Secretaryof Health and Human Services, 899
F2d 53 (1st Cir 1990), vacated by 500 US 949 (1991); Planned Parenthoodv Sullivan, 913
F2d 1492 (10th Cir 1990), vacated by 500 US 949 (1991). While these cases were both vacated without opinion, the Court's opinion in Rust mandated deference to this interpretation. See text accompanying notes 12-14.
873 F2d 395 (DC Cir 1989).
Id at 398.
"The Commission has great latitude in determining the scope of the ferry exemption [to ICC jurisdiction] and in modifying it from time to time as the Commission sees
fit." Id.
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not] perceive,"8 6 and remanded the case to the agency for clarification.87
In the remaining two cases," despite the lack of an independent reason not to defer, the courts did not defer to altered
agency interpretations. These were two of the earliest cases in
the survey, however. Both pre-date Rust, which arguably rein9 Furthermore, they
vigorated Chevron after Cardoza-Fonseca."
both cite mainly pre-Chevron precedent. Were these cases to be
decided today, it seems plausible that the courts would have deferred. 90
Id at 400 (citation omitted).
Id at 402. See also Salameda v INS, 70 F3d 447 (7th Cir 1995), where the INS altered its interpretation of a statute, without explanation. "Agencies do not have the same
freedom as courts to change direction without acknowledging and justifying the change."
Id at 450 (emphasis added and citations omitted). Compare id at 456 (Easterbrook dissenting) (INS position did not change, so court should defer.). While it is possible that
courts are using the hard look doctrine as a substitute for not deferring, this does not differentiate revised agency interpretations from initial ones. But see note 77, discussing
the possibility that courts are using this as a "back door" route to not defer specifically to
revised interpretations.
' Barnett v Weinberger, 818 F2d 953 (DC Cir 1987); Peters v United States, 853 F2d
692 (9th Cir 1988).
See Part I.
Peters, 853 F2d at 700 ("Mnterpretation is entitled to less weight when it represents an abrupt change from longstanding practice.") (citing InternationalBrotherhoodof
Teamsters v Daniel, 439 US 551, 565-69 (1979)); Barnett,818 F2d at 960-61 ("It is well established that the prestige of a statutory construction by an agency depends crucially
upon whether it was promulgated contemporaneously with enactment of the statute, and
has been adhered to consistently over time.") (citations omitted); id at 961 n 74 (citing an
extremely long list of precedents, all predating Chevron).
These two cases were also interesting factually: one involved a rather implausible interpretation, and the other seems almost certainly to have been driven by sympathy, not
law.
In Peters, the INS issued a "John Doe" summons requiring the director of a farm labor camp to produce records on all current residents, in connection with an ongoing
criminal investigation of illegal immigrants. Peters, 853 F2d at 694-95. The lower court
imputed IRS "John Doe Summons law," id, to the INS, thus allowing this summons, but
the appellate court reversed. The court clarified that "[a] 'John Doe' summons is, in essence, a direction to a third party to surrender information concerning taxpayers whose
identity is currently unknown to the IRS." Id at 695 n 3 (citation omitted). The appellate
court relied on the fact that, after Congress had acted to explicitly allow the IRS to issue
such a summons, the Supreme Court questioned whether such a summons could arise by
implication, in the context of the IRS. See id at 696-98. No such provisions existed for the
INS, however, and the INS could not point to any prior instances where it had even asked
for such a summons. Id at 700. In essence, the INS's interpretation in this case was simply very weak.
Barnett seems, for all intents and purposes, to be a case of judicial insubordination.
The completely and permanently disabled daughter of a member of the military was covered under her father's federal health insurance program. That insurance program forbade coverage of mere "custodial care," however, and the question to be decided was
whether her permanent hospital care counted as such. Barnett, 818 F2d at 954-56. Deci-
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Thus, of the forty-three appellate court cases examined,
courts refused to defer to an acknowledged changed interpretation, not independently problematic, in exactly two cases. It
seems plausible that courts today might have deferred in these
two cases. Even if not, one could easily argue that an equivalent
percentage of original interpretations might also have been found
unreasonable and not due deference.9 ' Thus, there is no evidence
that either the Supreme Court or appellate courts, despite their
rhetoric, are deferring to revised interpretations any less than
they defer to any other agency interpretation of a statute. This
strongly suggests that they are deferring equally.
IV. Do REVISED AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS DESERVE
DEFERENCE?
It seems, then, that revised agency interpretations may be
receiving full Chevron deference. Should they be? Building on the
framework of Chevron doctrine and theory described earlier,9 2
this Part will show how, unlike other acknowledged exceptions to
Chevron deference, deferring to revised interpretations is completely consistent with the reasons underlying Chevron defer93
ence.
After briefly discussing one uncontroversial limitation on an
agency's power to revise its interpretation of a statute-that the
agency must acknowledge that it is changing its interpretationthis Part will create an explanatory typology of revised interpretations that shows that revised interpretations deserve deference
sion in the case took over five years, involved almost 150 footnotes (citing precedent back
to 1877), and eventually reached the conclusion-motivated, it seems, by sympathy towards the family-that the Secretary of Defense's 1977 interpretation of the statutory exclusion for "custodial care," significantly broader than his 1966 interpretation, was not
due deference. See id at 968-70. While this opinion is factually interesting, it is questionable precedent.
" A full investigation of Chevron cases not involving revised interpretations is beyond
the scope of this Comment. A quick investigation of the 206 federal appellate cases decided in 1995, however, found several in which agency interpretations, neither revised
nor independently problematic under the various theories of Part II, were overturned by
courts. See, for example, American Trucking Associations, Inc v Federal Highway Ad-

ministration,51 F3d 405, 409 (4th Cir 1995) (holding the FHWA's interpretation of the
Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991 to be "plainly unreasonable"); Parisi by Cooney v Chater,69 F3d 614, 619 (1st Cir 1995) (Commissioner's interpretation of
the Social Security Act is "supported neither by the language of the statute nor by reason").

See Part II.
Justice Scalia put it straightforwardly, "[After Chevron], there is no longer any justification for giving 'special' deference to 'long standing and consistent' agency interpretations of law." Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 517 (cited in note 23).
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under the rationales for Chevron. Finally, it will discuss possible
policy reasons for not deferring to revised agency interpretations,
concluding that, if anything, these arguments challenge Chevron
deference in general, not deference to revised interpretations in
particular. This suggests that if Chevron deference is ever appropriate (a question left to other commentators), it should apply
with equal force to revised agency interpretations.
A. Agencies Must Give an Explanation for Changing
Interpretations
It is a commonplace that agencies must justify their policies
and actions; they must also justify revising their interpretation of
a statute. 4 Under the "Hard Look" doctrine, an agency action is
arbitrary and capricious if not explained.95 This does not imply
that agencies cannot change their interpretations; it only means
that they cannot do so without admitting what they are doing.9"
Requiring an explanation for a change in no way mandates that,
once an agency has provided such an explanation, the interpretation does not deserve as much deference as any other.
B. A Typology of Reasons for an Agency to Revise Its
Interpretation of a Statute
There are only a few reasons why an agency might change
its interpretation of a statute: (1) The agency could become convinced that its initial interpretation was inconsistent with congressional intent, regardless of how that prior interpretation was
functioning ("Initial Mistake"). (2) The agency could decide that
its prior interpretation, while one of several reasonable ones, led
to a slew of unfortunate side effects, whereas a different, textually reasonable interpretation would not do so ("Better Alternative"). (3) The agency could determine that its prior interpretaSee, for example, Smiley v Citibank (South Dakota), NA., 116 S Ct 1730, 1734
(1996) ("Sudden and unexplained change ... may be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of

discretion. But if [this pitfall is] avoided, change is not invalidating.") (citations omitted).
See, for example, Motor Vehicle Mfrs Assn v State Farm Mutual Auto Ins Co, 463
US 29, 46-57 (1983) (applying the doctrine but not referring to it by name). See also Stephen G. Breyer and Richard B. Stewart, AdministrativeLaw and Regulatory Policy: Problems, Text, and Cases 363-64 (Little, Brown 3d ed 1992) (summarizing the doctrine).
9 See Smiley, 116 S Ct at 1734; Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2104 (cited in note 23)
("[Algencies should be allowed to depart from interpretations ....
What is necessary is
that the new interpretation be explained as reasonable in light of statutorily permissible
factors."); Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 518 (cited in note 23) ("[S]o long as [ ] limitations [on
sudden, irrational, or unexplained change] are complied with, there seems to me no reason to value a new interpretation less than an old one.").
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tion was leading to horrific unintended consequences, and that,
though the agency did not know the full implications of an alternative interpretation, side effects of that interpretation could not
be worse than those of the current interpretation ("Agency
Flailing"). Or (4) the agency could decide that a different interpretation of the statute would better fit with new overarching
agency (or administration) goals, while still implementing the
statute acceptably ("Policy Change"). 7
The striking thing about this list of possible reasons for altering an interpretation of a statute is that, although the reasons
differ radically from each other, they are all fully acceptable and
justifiable under the policies behind Chevron deference."
1. Initial mistakes.
Possibly the least obvious case for Chevron deference is when
an agency's explanation for a change is that the agency simply
"got it wrong" the first time and misinterpreted the congressional
mandate. Yet the very act of revising an earlier interpretation
must be based at least partially on the agency's expertise in the
area regulated by the statute. Perhaps the agency realizes that it
is interpreting the same term differently under two parts of the
same statute; perhaps it comes to understand that an exception
in the statute must be read more broadly than initially thought
in order for the exception to have the intended effect. In either
case, agency expertise justifies judicial deference.
2. Better alternatives.
An agency also should be able to change its interpretation of
a statute when it realizes an alternative interpretation is superior, even though both interpretations are plausible. A priori, this
alternative interpretation of the statute would have been accepted by a court had it been initially proffered; the fact that a
different interpretation was previously offered does not change
this. Two justifications for deferring to agency interpretations
Left off this list are manifestly inappropriate reasons for altering an interpretation,
such as knowing that a particular company would benefit from an alternative interpretation or wanting to "do the right thing" regardless of congressional mandate. Note, however, that these, too, do not differentiate revised interpretations from initial interpretations. Likewise, while any of these changes could be the result of unacceptable lobbying
by persons affected by the statute, initial interpretations might also be the result of such
pressures.
" Note also that agencies can, and often do, change their interpretations of statutes
within the context of their initial rulemaking process.
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are that agencies are politically accountable and that Congress
wanted to delegate these decisions to agencies. In other words,
Congress implicitly granted the agency interstitial policy-making
authority. By revising an interpretation, the agency is simply
carrying out Congress's mandate.9
3. Agency flailing.
When an agency is either obviously or avowedly struggling to
find a workable interpretation of a statute, one might think that
the agency's interpretations should not be entitled to deference.
The appropriate question to ask under Chevron, though, is not
whether the agency is successful in this enterprise, but who is
more likely to succeed-the agency or the court. Just because the
agency has not provided a workable interpretation does not mean
that the court will identify a better one. If an agency is having
difficulty, the statute may be poorly written, inconsistent with
other agency mandates, or fail to take into account vital yet unanticipated side effects. Once one is willing to presume that Congress implicitly delegated policy-making power to agencies for
reasons of accountability and expertise, however, it follows that
in these cases it is particularly appropriate for a court to defer.
Either the agency is going to have to make a choice among bad
options, or the statutory term in question has no "best" interpretation. The agency, after realizing how bad a previous interpretation was, is trying again; unless one rejects the rationales underlying Chevron, an agency deserves deference when it does so.
4. Policy changes.
One of the standard reasons for deferring to an agency is the
agency's expertise.' ° After all, when attempting to define a
"stationary source," an EPA specialist will surely better understand the possibilities and implications of different definitions
than a court made up of non-scientists. The same argument from
expertise suggests the same deference is appropriate when an
agency changes its interpretation of "stationary source," having
decided that as a matter of policy it dislikes the prior interpretation. Given the congressional mandate to the agency to fill in the
ambiguity, 01 and given the fact that the agency is politically acSee text accompanying notes 41-42.
"°See Chevron, 467 US at 865. See also Breyer, 38 Admin L Rev at 368-69 (cited in
note 41).
.'Recall the Court's statement in Smiley v Citibank (South Dakota),NA, 116 S Ct
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countable while the judiciary is not, there is no reason why a
court should
tell the agency that its revised interpretation is
02
wrong.
Thus it seems that the courts are getting it right, whatever
they claim to be doing. Under Chevron, revised agency interpretations of statutes deserve the same deference as all other interpretations. So long as agencies do not change their interpretations for no reason at all-a possibility that is reduced by the requirement that agencies provide reasons-agencies should be allowed to change their interpretations without receiving less deference.
C. Arguments Against Deferring to Revised Interpretations
One might object that revised interpretations should not receive Chevron deference because they are not consistent with
Congress's intentions. One of the classic rationales for deferring
to agency interpretations of statutes is that the interpretation is
a strong indication of what Congress intended the statute to
mean."°3 Under this rationale, it follows that contemporaneous
interpretations, those which were issued in the immediate wake
of the passage of the statute, would deserve deference. The
agency was quite possibly involved in drafting the statute, and, if
1730, 1733 (1996), that under Chevron there is a "presumption that Congress, when it left
ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency
(rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows."
" If this claim seems a little strong, recall that this is exactly what the Chevron Court
said. Chevron, 467 US at 865-66. See also Rust v Sullivan, 500 US 173 (1991) (deferring
to government reinterpretation of Title X so as to impose a "gag rule" preventing doctors
at family planning clinics receiving federal funds from discussing abortion with their clients).
Professor Weaver has attempted to limit this rationale for deference, arguing that
courts should not defer if "a later administration is hostile to a prior regulatory scheme,"
since in that case the new "interpretation [might be] inconsistent with the purpose or
function of that scheme." Weaver, 44 Baylor L Rev at 560 (cited in note 65). Of course it is
possible that a future administration might attempt to change the interpretation of a
statute in ways that are textually impossible, but this is not a reason for less deference to
the revision. First, Weaver is assuming that the initial interpretation was that of an administration favorable to the statute, which, while likely, is not necessarily the case.
Moreover, if one assumes that Congress delegated this particular policy decision to the
agency, as one must under Chevron, one must also assume that Congress knew that future administrations might be more or less hostile to Congress's current goals, and thus it
is Congress's role to set forth a statute that appropriately cabins the agency. Furthermore, the court must still determine that an interpretation of the statute is reasonable
under Chevron; deference is not the same as abdication.
" See Hers, 6 Admin L J at 194 (cited in note 58).
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not, would presumably know the impetus for the statute and
have access to the congressional staff members who wrote it.
Similarly, if Congress does not overrule an agency interpretation,
that inaction might be taken as indirect evidence that this longstanding interpretation is reasonable.
While this is a perfectly coherent view of why courts should
defer to agency interpretations of statutes, it is fundamentally
inconsistent with the rationales underlying Chevron."' The above
arguments necessarily assume, first, that Congress had an intent
with regard to the question at hand, of which the agency's interpretation is only evidence; and second, that Congress did not intend to delegate the question to the agency so it could make a
policy judgment on its own. These might be reasonable assumptions, but they are not the assumptions of the Chevron Court."5
Further, they are not assumptions that truly differentiate cases
of revised agency interpretations from others; these assumptions
rely on agency expertise, which does not necessarily correlate
with whether an interpretation has been revised.
The strongest argument against deferring to revised agency
interpretations is that parties have a right to rely on agency interpretations of statutes, and to have agencies interpret those
statutes consistently, similar to the principle of stare decisis in
courts.' O6 For reasons of predictability and planning, agencies
should consistently interpret statutes. Furthermore, it seems
plausible that shifts in interpretation may be the result of political pressure.
This argument misinterprets the issue, however; agencies
are not courts, and are not subject to stare decisis. The agency is
acting as a stand-in for Congress, by setting policies in areas
where Congress either explicitly or implicitly wanted the agency
to do so. There is no requirement that Congress be constant, especially when it sees better policy alternatives. Given Chevron's
interpretation of statutory ambiguity as a delegation of policy-

" See id at 194-95 (agreeing, though arguing that pre-Chevron deference is prefer-

able).
'Recall the Court's most recent statement, in Smiley, 116 S Ct at 1733; see notes 41
and 101.
"See Merrill, 101 Yale L J at 1018-19 (cited in note 69) (duration of executive interpretation leads to reliance interests parallel to court interpretations); Sunstein, 90 Colum
L Rev at 2102 (cited in note 23) (same); Smiley, 116 S Ct at 1734 ("[Clhange that does not
take account of legitimate reliance on prior interpretation may be arbitrary, capricious
[or] an abuse of discretion.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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making authority to agencies, there10 should
likewise be no such
7
consistent.
be
they
that
requirement
There are, however, two situations in which revised interpretations deserve less deference: when an agency interpretation
is inconsistent with prior court precedent,0 8 and when an agency
assumes an interpretation for purposes of pending litigation."° In
both of these situations, an agency's current interpretation is
likely to be inconsistent with past agency interpretations. This
supports rather than undermines the thesis of this Comment,
however. In these situations, courts should not defer, regardless
of whether the agency's interpretation is a revision of a previous
one." o In the absence of these situations, however, courts should
defer to revised interpretations.
CONCLUSION: RETURNING TO CHEVRON

Although Chevron is immensely important, cited in over
3,500 cases in twelve years,"' the underlying premise of the case
remains unclear. If the case stands for what the Court said-that
agencies are presumed more expert than courts, have more political accountability than courts, and have been implicitly delegated to by Congress when Congress leaves a statute ambiguous-then there is no reason to defer any less to an acknowledged revised interpretation of a statute than to any other
agency interpretation. For a court to do otherwise undermines
the essence of Chevron deference and makes deference into either
a "doctrine of desperation"" or a truly revolutionary doctrine,
undermining the Marbury view of the role of the courts in interpreting laws."' Both options seem less attractive than complying
with the Chevron doctrine as originally announced.
Luckily, such a reinvigoration would not be difficult. As this
survey demonstrates, the courts have actually been deferring to
revised interpretations anyway, despite what they say. Perhaps
"For a similar argument, see Pierce, 41 Vand L Rev at 313 (cited in note 35) (arguing
that since interpretations are policy decisions, they should trump even stare decisis).
Note also that, given the system of rule-making under the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 USC §§ 553 et seq (1994), it seems fatuous to presume that agencies do not face political
pressure in arriving at their initial interpretations of statutes.
" See Part II.C.3.
"See Part I.C.2.
"'See text accompanying notes 50-51 and note 53 (discussing why these exceptions
are not inconsistent with deferring to revised interpretations).
' See note 67.
"MNS v Cardoza-Fonseca,480 US 421,454 (1987) (Scalia concurring).
"'Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2075 (cited in note 23).
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courts do not acknowledge this practice because they are uncomfortable with Chevron itself. But if this is true, the courts should
be explicit about it, rather than focusing on a small subset of
cases that are no more or less likely to be problematic under the
rationales for Chevron than any other case. Other exceptions to
Chevron deference make sense under the Chevron doctrine; excepting revised interpretations does not.

